Retail Security: The Merchant’s Need to Employ Creative Methods
A misperception often shared by retailers and the public alike is
that e-commerce losses to fraud are growing like wildfire. In fact, fraud
losses, at least as a percentage of online sales have remained just about the
same for the last three years: 1.4%. But as e-commerce sales have grown, that
steady percentage of fraud has meant that dollar losses have inexorably climbed
as well. Last year, retailers and other entities engaging in e-commerce in
North America lost an estimated $4 billion to fraud, an alarming 11% increase
over the year before.
So there is little inclination on the part of retailers to relax
their e-commerce vigilance. The problem is how best to spread always-limited
anti-fraud budgets over the available tools and processes. It’s a challenge for
the largest merchants and it can drive smaller organizations to distraction.
"What retailers don't always realize in today’s world is that
fraud prevention and detection are becoming very complex," says Brent
MacLean, senior security manager for J.B. MacLean Consulting Inc. "Having
fraud detection tools in place is only one piece of a very complicated puzzle.
If those tools are not properly applied and interpreted properly or are too limited
in their scope, they are not going to be that effective in combating this
growing problem."
According to MacLean, to effectively combat fraud, retailers need
to create an automated, multi-layered fraud detection strategy that casts a
broad but fine net over fraud. The desired end result? Maximize sales, minimize
fraud, and reduce expensive manual review.
"When applying fraud detection tools, retailers need to think
in 4D (four dimensions) of fraud detection: global validation, single merchant
purchase history, multi-merchant purchase history, and purchase device
tracing," MacLean says. According to a security studies across the globe,
most merchants concentrate their fraud detection efforts on one or two
dimensions, which limits their ability to assess the true risk of retail
transactions.
"Performance has less to do with the number of fraud
detection tools used and more to do with the dimensions of detection to which
the tools are being applied," says MacLean, senior manager, "The
important thing is to apply necessary detectors in such a way that limits
fraudsters in such a way that there is less of a chance of them being able to
replicate an individuals identity."
The most commonly applied dimension of fraud detection is global
validation, which is a first pass attempt to verify a) the customer is actually
in possession of the credit card being used to make the purchase, b) the
cardholder is who he or she claims to be, and c) the card itself is legitimate.
These detection techniques take place in conjunction with the authorization and
for the most part are transparent to the customer.
Global validation techniques include CVV, AVS, payer
authentication, delivery address and phone number verification. CVV (cardholder
verification value) is a three-digit code found on the back of the credit card
that is used to verify the customer is in possession of the card during
checkout. AVS (address verification service) matches the billing address
provided by the customer to that on file at the card-issuing bank. Payer
authentication requires customers to enter the password they established for
their account. Delivery address verification uses unique elements of an
address, such as apartment numbers, suite numbers, and post office boxes, to
verify a shipping address. All these help merchants to verify the authenticity
of the cardholder in diligent and continued efforts to reduce fraud across the
board.
"Retailers want to know if the delivery address is valid and
whether the account data provided correlates to the customer before they
complete the sale," MacLean says. "But this is just the starting
point. If this is all retailers do to detect fraud, they will begin to see
significant improvements on the number of frauds perpetrated. There is an
entire underground industry built around stealing data to fool global
validation tests, and selling that data to fraudsters so merchants need to go
beyond these simple tests." “We need to be vigilant on these procedures if
we are going to combat this growing threat”, MacLean says.
The second dimension of detection is single-merchant purchase
history. Here, using systems trend monitoring, where retailers monitor the
purchase patterns of customers at their own web site, assessing whether the
frequency or volume of purchase (product and/or dollars within a certain
timeframe) is out of the ordinary. Here the retailer also checks whether the
identity of the purchaser is matched to a positive list (known as good
customers list to that retailer) or negative list (known bad identities based
on their own experience with the customer).
The third dimension of detection is multi-merchant purchase
history. In 1995, merchants began building a database that tracks purchase
behavior across multiple merchants demographics, and other sources of information
gathering, and provided a risk assessment model retailers can use to gauge the
risk of a transaction by correlating dozens of order details across merchants
and over time to identify suspect patterns; a very valuable tool for retailers.
For example, the service would help retailers flag an order if a
customer's name is attached to more than one credit card used for a prior
purchase, as well as different shipping or billing addresses, even if that
merchant had no history with that customer. "What we are looking for are
activity patterns across large groups of names, addresses or card
numbers," MacLean says. "Criminals will often work several card
accounts simultaneously and will mix and match customer names with credit card
account numbers and shipping and billing addresses to avoid detection. This
identity morphing is common, but hard for individual retailers to
identify."
"Criminals are getting smarter and creative. Instead of
hitting a single retailer in rapid fire succession, they are spreading out
fraudulent purchases over a larger base to avoid detection longer,"
MacLean says. "The goal is to spot the common element across multiple
transactions. It's rare that criminals will have new customer and billing
information for every fraudulent transaction they attempt."
Still, some criminals do succeed in avoiding detection when using
stolen card information. To counter, a fourth dimension of detection is
required purchase device tracing. The aim of this dimension is to trace the
network and device being used to make the purchase and understand
inconsistencies in that digital identity. This method enables retailers to
digitally trace the device the fraudster is using to access the retailer's web
site and initiate the transaction.
The technique, known as device fingerprinting, identifies traits
specific to a computer or wireless Internet device.
To gather these identifiers, merchants insert code into their
order page instructing the web site to capture the device-specific traits.
Traits making up a device's fingerprint are visible when the device is
communicating with a web site. The tracking code does not identify any personal
information about the user. By identifying a device's fingerprint, retailers
can determine when a fraudster is attempting to make multiple orders with the
same device, even if he or she is using different customer names, account data,
etc., for each transaction.
"Every computer or wireless Internet device has specific
characteristics and there are enough that can be passively gathered to create a
fingerprint," explains MacLean. "Matching these traits to
transactions provides a higher level of security against fraud."
Once retailers thoroughly understand the effectiveness of using
four dimensions of fraud detection, they can apply them in combinations
appropriate for the product category and market being served (fraud patterns
and purchase behaviors differ by culture). Doing so not only prevents fraud,
but can also reduce the risk of rejecting valid orders. As an example, if one
dimension indicates a potentially fraudulent transaction, but the customer has
made prior purchases without triggering a red flag, the retailer may want to
apply a stronger detection method to assess the transaction at a more granular
level.
"Sometimes good customers can unwittingly take actions that
trigger a red flag," MacLean says. "That means detection methods have
to be more sophisticated and aggressive to determine the validity of a red
flag. The idea is to be more precise, and not taking a broad-brush approach to
fraud prevention or putting a high percentage of transactions under manual
review."
Most retailers lack the resources to manually review a large
percentage of suspect transactions. "Relying too heavily on manual
techniques for advanced fraud detection will strain a merchant's ability to
keep up with the expected increase in fraud attempts," MacLean says.
By adding more sophisticated tools that help automate fraud
detection, retailers can thoroughly review more transactions with fewer staff
resources. That's good news for retailers facing the prospect of staff
restrictions.
"Manual fraud screening is time-consuming and expensive and
retailers can't scale their staff to meet the growth in transaction
volume," MacLean says. "The more automation retailers bring to fraud
screening, the more effective they will become at fraud prevention and serving
their customers." Technology is advancing at exponential and alarming
rates. It is hard to keep up with the creativity of the common criminal. We have
to continually become more vigilant to the creativity of the on-line hackers
and criminals that are seeking to circumvent these security policies; policies
that need our daily attention and modification if we are to keep the fraud
levels to a minimum. It is a daily process and should become part of everyone’s
lifestyle. A reality that we now have to embrace as technology has embraced
mankind. It is here to stay.